Introduction
"Because terrorist use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is difficult to deter, prevent, or ameliorate and is potentially catastrophic in most cases, it is the greatest threat to U.S. national security today and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future." 1 Nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons are no longer the exclusive domains of first world powers. Rather, the list of players capable of developing and exploiting these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is growing rapidly and includes a variety of both state and nonstate actors (NSAs). The ability of the United States to protect its global interests, fulfill its responsibilities in the world community, and meet the challenges of the future depends on its ability to exercise the strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility. 2 The key to achieving these strategic concepts lies in achieving full spectrum dominance across the entire range of potential military operations through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. 3 Asymmetric use of WMD by potential adversaries can deny full spectrum dominance by directly threatening the U.S. homeland and America's critical strengths: the political institutions, the industrial infrastructure, the financial infrastructure, the transportation and communications networks, the military forces, and the safety, security and well-being of American citizens.
The United States has sought to address this threat through a strategy of counterproliferation based on deterrence-"the prevention from action by fear of the consequences." 4 Effective deterrence depends on the availability of a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses, counterforce and consequence management capabilities, and supporting command, control communications and intelligence. 5 Whether or not the United States' homeland consequence management capabilities are adequately prepared to deal with the threat of terrorist employment of WMD is the question addressed in this paper.
Current WMD Threat
"Military and intelligence experts believe that the greatest threat to the United States from WMD is posed by terrorist groups or individuals, because nations that employed such weapons would face disproportionate retaliation." 6 The potential for terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, employing extremely destructive NBC weapons, represents a significant vulnerability that can be regarded as "small" only in the sense that few aggressors have chosen to exploit it. 7 At least 25 countries now possess, or are in the process of acquiring and developing, capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction using nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. A larger number of countries are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice.
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Although terrorist NBC attacks have been rare in the past, the reasons for this infrequency are eroding. 9 The underlying technology for production and employment of NBC weapons is becoming increasingly accessible and the number of potential aggressors possessing these weapons or access to the capability for production and employment is growing. A free and open society cannot construct a perfect defense against terrorist attacks.
As a result, virtually all potential state, and non-state aggressors could employ terrorist means of delivery against targets in the United States with good chances of success. 10 Nuclear weapons are within the reach of tens of states. The most significant constraint on both state and non-state acquisition is the ability to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). If this obstacle is overcome, either through the theft or the purchase of fissile material, any state with a reasonable technical and industrial infrastructure or an exceptionally capable NSA could design and build a nuclear weapon.
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Many states and moderately sophisticated NSAs are capable of producing improvised but effective biological weapons. The procedures for culturing microorganisms or growing and purifying toxins are inexpensive and could be accomplished by someone with college level training and a basic knowledge of laboratory techniques. 12 Agents can be chosen based on the intended target (i.e., humans, animals or plants), their effects (i.e., sicken, incapacitate or kill), their ability to spread beyond those initially exposed, their degree of resistance to medical treatment, and their ease of cultivation and dissemination. 13 The most significant technical obstacle in fabricating a biological weapon is development of the means for effectively disseminating the agent. 14 Nevertheless, all the equipment required for production is dual-use and is available through commercial sources, and equipment to aerosolize biological agents is available as virtually off-the-shelf systems produced for legitimate industrial, medical, and agricultural applications. 15 19 In general, a ballistic missile WMD attack would be relatively easy to detect, but difficult to defeat, while a covert WMD attack would be difficult to detect, but relatively easy to defeat, if identified in advance. 20 There is a growing consensus among experts and government officials that the threat of non-state violence involving WMD is becoming one of the most serious security challenges of the modern era. This dynamic can be attributed to changes in the nature of non-state violence, the ease of acquiring NBC weapons, and the evolving role of the United States in the world community. The threat of NBC terrorism is becoming more serious over time because societal trends are increasing the number of groups that are both capable of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and interested in inflicting mass casualties. 21 The precise reasons for the increased interest in causing mass casualties are unclear. However, five emerging trends reflect the shift toward increasingly lethal non-state violence: terrorist acts and violence motivated by religion; local opposition to U.S. influence and military presence in the Persian Gulf region; right-wing terrorism; "amateur" terrorists; and extreme acts of violence motivated by racism and ethnic hatred. In response to the increasing WMD threat, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, in June 1995. PDD-39 elaborated a national policy, a strategy, and an interagency coordination and management structure to combat terrorism. Additionally, it expanded roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for combating domestic terrorism. The strategy consisted of three main elements:
1. Reduce vulnerabilities and prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur.
2. Conduct crisis management-respond to terrorist acts that do occur and apprehend and punish terrorists.
3. Conduct consequence management-manage the consequences of terrorist acts.
Restore capabilities to protect public health and safety, provide essential government services, and provide emergency relief.
PDD-39 also identified specific actions that agencies are to conduct within each element of the strategy. 
Operational Assessment
The key to achieving unity of command and unity of effort for America's homeland defense depends upon establishing a clearly defined national strategy from which welldefined mission statements can be derived. Based on the assigned missions, doctrine can be established to guide the development of concepts of operation, coordinate interagency relationships, and guide the formulation of operating plans. However:
One of the major deficiencies in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage between the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Much of the federal efforts to combat terrorism have been based upon vulnerabilities rather than an analysis of credible threats….
[A]gencies have used and are still using improbable "worst case scenarios" to plan and develop programs. While there has been a major effort to develop a national strategy, to date the strategy does not include a clear desired outcome to be achieved. Resources to combat terrorism have increased in terms of both budgets and programs. These increased resources have not been clearly linked to a threat analysis and … some agency initiatives appear at odds with the judgments of the intelligence community. This situation also creates the potential for agencies to develop their own programs without adequate coordination, leaving the potential for gaps and/or duplication. 39 Indeed, gaps do exist in the current interagency coordination that could pose a major problem during a WMD incident response. Under the current FRP, FBI-led crisis management activities and FEMA-led consequence management activities may occur concurrently if an apparent terrorist WMD incident occurs without warning and immediately produces major consequences. The FRP does not identify any specific criteria for the transfer of lead agency responsibility from the FBI to FEMA. Instead, the plan states that the lead agency role may be transferred from the FBI to FEMA once the Attorney General, in consultation with the directors of the FBI and FEMA, determines that the FBI no longer needs to function as the lead agency. This arrangement provides the maximum degree of flexibility to the lead agencies for management of any given event. However, in doing so, it also offers the greatest potential for confusion for the supporting agencies, especially those organizations such as JTF-CS who perform support functions throughout all phases of a terrorist incident. 40 In addition to the need to resolve the ambiguity in the criteria for transfer of authority during a "no warning" WMD event, there is a need for improved coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. In some instances, federal agencies have developed assistance programs without coordinating them with existing state and local emergency management structures. This practice has generated confusion at the state and local levels. Furthermore, there continues to be confusion regarding the roles of the federal government versus the state and local governments at the site of a terrorist incident. Command and control relationships need to be further clarified. 41 The restriction on the use of active duty military forces to support the designated LFA is another concern. "The U.S. Government's plans for a catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States do not employ the full range of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) capabilities for managing large operations. Additionally, the interagency coordination and cooperation required to integrate the DOD properly into counterterrorism planning has not been accomplished." 42 Currently, DOD involvement in the event of a homeland WMD incident is limited to supporting the agencies that are currently designated as having the lead in a terrorism crisis. However, in exceptional circumstances, if a catastrophe should exceed the capabilities of local, state, and other federal agencies, or if it is directly related to an armed conflict overseas, the President may wish to designate DOD as the lead federal agency. Any such proposal would give rise to serious legal and policy issues that would require careful consideration to safeguard American civil liberties. Prior decisions regarding the criteria for determining when, if ever, to implement this option would allow operational commanders to: clarify the roles of various organizations within the DOD; establish the framework to support interagency coordination and communications; and conduct the necessary deliberate planning to allow the most effective deployment of U.S. forces. 43 Differences in terminology complicate coordination between federal agencies. For example, the FBI definition of "counterterrorism" refers to the full range of the organization's activities directed against terrorism, including preventive and crisis management efforts. Conversely, the DOD definition of "counterterrorism" refers to offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attack, while the DOD uses the term "antiterrorism" to refer to defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These differences in terminology increase the likelihood of misunderstandings between agencies and could promote the growth of gaps in planning or in the development of capabilities. 44 According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use WMD agents, in part, because they are more difficult to obtain, develop, and weaponize or otherwise disseminate. However, the likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological materials may increase over the next decade. however, DOJ has not continued the program. As a result, any one of the 15 cities without trained responders may lack the capabilities to react effectively to a WMD incident and, consequently, will be more likely to require federal assistance. Additionally, the lack of prior training will almost certainly complicate coordination of federal response efforts in these locales. 47 The 1. Federal programs addressing terrorism appear, in many cases, to be fragmented, overlapping, lacking focus, and uncoordinated. 2. A terrorist group would face many difficulties in acquiring or developing and delivering a device with the capability to cause mass casualties. 3. The United States should reconsider the "worst case scenario" assessments that have dominated domestic preparedness planning for CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] terrorism. 4. There should be a comprehensive and articulate assessment of potential credible terrorist threats as part of a risk and vulnerability assessment. 5. It is not always clear "who is in charge" at the federal and state or local level when an incident occurs. 6. There should be agreed-upon templates for local to Federal handoffs of command and control, and these should be exercised in advance. 7. A national strategy-beyond the existing Attorney General's Plan-is needed to address domestic preparedness and CBRN terrorism.
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Recommendations
The range of deficiencies identified above is cause for concern and calls into question whether or not the United States' homeland consequence management capabilities are, in fact, adequately prepared to deal with the threat of terrorist employment of WMD. A number of government studies have expressed much less optimistic conclusions. Indeed, the most recent study conducted by The U.S. Commission on National Security warned that "without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained." 49 The Commission went on to recommend sweeping changes, including the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency, and unification of the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Border Patrol into a new homeland security body, whose director would have cabinet status. Additionally, the Commission recommended changing the main focus of the National Guard to address the prospect of an attack on U.S.
soil. According to former senator Warren Rudman, "The threat is asymmetric and we're not ready for it." clear and unambiguous strategy will allow the ways and means required to achieve the overall strategic objective to be identified, thereby facilitating unity of effort and eliminating the development of redundant capabilities.
2. Establish WMD consequence management capabilities based on threat assessments and risk analyses. For each threat scenario, consider the probability of a successful attack and the probability for each potential outcome associated with the attack (e.g., catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible). Training and resources should be focused primarily on those scenarios with the highest probability of occurrence and the potential for the most severe destruction. It is impossible to prepare for every potential vulnerability. Focusing preparations on thwarting the most likely and most destructive WMD incidents will maximize the deterrent capability attained within each organization's constrained resources. 51 3. Clarify the criteria governing which agency has the lead during all phases of a WMD incident. Standardized criteria must be identified and published in both crisis management and consequence management response plans to preclude misunderstandings at the local, state or federal level during an actual WMD incident. Additionally, publication of these transition criteria will allow agencies to develop training scenarios to exercise coordination capabilities and, by doing so, preclude costly delays and confusion during an actual WMD incident.
4. Seek National Command Authority clarification of the role for DOD in the event of a catastrophic WMD incident. Prepare deliberate plans and establish the framework to support interagency coordination and communications, as necessary.
Conclusions
Asymmetric use of WMD provides the means for potential adversaries to threaten the U.S. homeland and America's critical strengths and, by doing so, preclude the U.S. from achieving its strategic objectives. America has sought to address this vulnerability through a strategy of counterproliferation based on deterrence. Through effective consequence management, it is possible to minimize the potential death and destruction from a WMD incident, thereby diminishing the adversary's triumph. PDD-39 and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici provide the basis for the U.S. response to terrorist use of WMD by establishing the crisis management and consequence management programs. Although significant progress has been made in implementing these programs, deficiencies remain in the areas of coordination, threat assessment, and training. Several government commissions have indicated the need for a major restructuring of the U.S. homeland defense program. Such initiatives will require years to implement, however. Significant near-term improvements in current consequence management capabilities, on the other hand, can be achieved by clarifying the national strategy and the desired outcome, focusing training, pursuing new capabilities based on threat-based risk assessments, and improving coordination. A prompt and urgent implementation of these steps will achieve the near-term improvement that the current state of consequence management demands. Only by this means will adversarial attacks be adequately deterred.
